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26 Aug 47-A-FjC-23-1-Urmey (Evand)
Court V Case VII
[....]
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: [....]Exhibit 515-A will be admitted in evidence
subject to the usual limitations t[sic] at we place on evidence of this
kind.
MR. RAPP: If your Honors will now please turn to page 4 ofDocument Book
23 and page 5 in the German Document book, your Honors,this is a
deposition by Egil Sorensen to the Norwegian Police of Vadsoedescribing
the destruction and killing of Sorensen's wife by members of the German
Wehrmacht.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I would ask the prosecution to tell meagainst
whom this document is directed. I have pointed out already thatthe navy
which is charged here and who is supposed to have committedsome
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act-- was not subordinate to the defendant Rendulic.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, as to the argumentation of defense counsel,we will
show later on and tie this document up that the defendantRendulic as a
matter of fact at that time commanded all German unitswithin the German
Wehrmacht in Norway in his capacity as armed forcescommander Norway and
commanding General 20th Mountain Army.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I am wondering whether this deposition iswithin
scope of the indictment against the defendant Rendulic withregard to his
conduct in Norway.
MR. RAPP: That is correct, your Honor; the area involved is in Finnmark,
the Lakesfjord, and is part of the evacuation conducted by the 20th
Mountain Army at that time.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: The point I make is, he is not charged withany
responsibility for killing anybody in Norway under theindictment, isn't
that correct?
MR. RAPP: Your Honors, I believe the indictment states that inconnection
with the evacuation, several hundred people suffered death.At least
61,000 people were evacuated, or 31,000 people forcefully and,in
connection with this, hardship and death was brought on the Norwegian
population.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: It is the opinion of the Tribunal that
theprobative value is rather questionable, but rather than try
todetermine that now, we will permit it to go in and deal with it at
theproper time.
MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor. May I call your Honor's attentionto the
fact that this particular document is only submitted here as anexcerpt,
but we have furnished &mdash; and the original document is inNorwegian
and we have only translated into German and English up toyesterday
&ndash; that part which we are submitting into evidence but I
havemeanwhile furnished defense counsel the complete translation of
thisNorwegian document for his use.
PRESIDING JUDGE CARTER: I think under those circumstances you canread
what parts you want to as long as you provide the balance to the
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defense.
MR. RAPP: Very well, your Honor.
"Report to: Police Chief Vadsoe submitted by Police Officer L. Naess.
"Subject:
"Compulsory evacuation and arson in Veidnedklubben and the killing of
Frau Wilhelmine Soerensen.
"Interrogated on 2 July 1946 in Veidnedklubben: The witnessWilhelmine
Soerensen. He is familiar with the incident and understandshis
responsibility as a witness. He is ready to make a statement anddeclares:
"On 16 December 1944 the witness was on the trip by motorboat toIfjord.
At that time most of the residences in Veidnes had been burnedby the
Germans, but the entire population had fled to the mountains andwas
living in adobe huts. No Germans were left in any camps inLakesfjord,
which made the population feel secure from the Germans.Arriving [v typed
over i] at Ifjord the witness and the other people inthe motorboat
suddenly became aware of a warship lying in the Trollbuktnear the shore.
Dawn had just broken and the moment the people in themotorboat saw the
warship, automatic weapons from there shot in frontand behind the
motorboat so that there was no possibility forflight.
"When the Commander of the warship hear[sic]d that the families of
thepeople had remained in Veidnes, the destroyer went to Veidnes.
"There the German lieutenant with 14 soldiers went ashore with aNorwegian
(Martin Mikelsen) who had orders to show the way to thefamilies.
"The witness and the other people on the motorboat remained aboardand
were locked into the boxes where the ropes are kept. There theyremained
locked up until 2100 hours when the Captain arrived and issuedan order to
some others to go ashore.
"The witness and two other people remained aboard in the box wherethe
ropes are kept all night. The next day at 12:00 o'clock the witnesswas
permitted to come out of the box and to move around the deck freely.
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About half an hour later the Norwegian Julius Mattisen came aboard. The
witness inquired of him concerning the witness'wife and for the first
time he heard that she had been shot to death bythe Germans up in the
mountains the afternoon or evening before. Thewitness then tried to talk
to the Captain. However, thelatter had gone ashore. At 2:00 o'clock the
same afternoon theCommander came aboard and the witness could talk to
him. The Captainrelated that the wife of the wi[sic]tness had been killed
unintentionally.Civilians some of them armed had fled at the arrival of
the Germans.The Kommando [sic] had opened fire from the ship and thus the
wife ofthe witness had been hit. The Captain further related that the
wife ofthe witness had been buried in a lake in the country. The witness
thenwanted to go in order to get the body he was not permitted to do so
andnow the Captain said she had been buried in the ocean."
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The name of the wife of the witness was Wilhelmine, nee Eriksen. Her body
has not been found.
. . . . . . . . . .
After the Germans had burned down all the remaining houses inVeidnes the
destro[o typed over y]y[y typed over o]er left for Hommingsvaag in the
evening of 17December.
. . . . . . . . . .
Adult males above 50 years of age were sent as prisoners to theprison
camp of Kroekeberg. Later they were interrogated by uniformedGermans.
Having been detained from 11 to 12 days, all prisoners fromVeidnes were
released from the camp together with some otherprisoners.
Read to and agreed to: signed Egil Soerensen.
. . . . . . . . . .
This particular document, Your Honor, I have just read will bemarked
Prosecution Exhibit 512. I forgot to mention that to theTribunal.
Then next, Your Honor, turn to page 61, if you please, Norway XI. Itwas
marked for identification 520-A, and is being offered asProsecution
Exhibit 520, It is on page 61 and page 56 of the Germandefense counsel
document book. On pages 56 and 57 of the German defensecounsel document
book.
This, your Honor, is a medical report by Dr. Karl Evang of theNorwegian
Ministry of Social welfare, and was requested by Lt. ColonelIvar
Follestad, Norwegian Attorney General's Office. Itdescribes the
destruction of Norwegian Medical Installations duringretreat. There is
also, attached to this particular instrument, a copyof a broadcast of
BBC. This particular document I am referring to nowwe are not pressing
for evidence at all. In other words, we aremerely offering the medical
report of Dr,[sic] Karl Evang. This is a letterdated June I8, 1947
addressed to Col. Follestad, and it states: &mdash;
DR. FRITSCH: I am sorry, I just want to see whether I have this letter.
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DR. RAPP: Your Honor, defense counsel was objecting to the fact thatI was
reading that part of the letter which dealt with a BBC broadcast,and I
have just mentioned, the fact we are not offering this, but thelast part
of this particular letter, Your Honor, ties up the followingpage of the
document. So in order not to create any further confusion Iwill read now
only the last paragraph of this letter, I havealready identified the
date of the letter and to whom it isaddressed.
. . . . .The details I have been able to gather are based thereforeon
accounts from individuals or from individual officials. Thematerial is of
very little use for statistical purposes, I can however,give the
following information on the medical institutions that weredestroyed by
the Germans in North Troms and Finnmark.
. . . . . . . . . .
Then if Your Honor will turn to page 62, page 58 of the GermanDefense
Counsel Book, the information is furnished as follows:
. . . . .North Troms:
Skjervoey nursing home, destroyed during the evacuation &ndash; 12 beds.
Malselv tuberculosis home. Used by the German air&ndash;force and
afterwards destroyed &ndash; 14 beds.
Lyngen tuberculosis home. Badly damaged during the evacuation &ndash; 18
beds. Finnmark:
The following institutions were razed to the ground: Hospital at Kirkenes
23 beds, nursing home 4 beds.
. . . . . . . . . .
I hope your Honor will permit me to dispense with some of the Norwegian
names, I am just trying to identify the lines some way.
. . . . . Vadsoe 45 beds, and another hospital at Vadsoe 30 beds, Vadoe
hospital 54 beds, and another at Vadoe 13 beds.
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.....Nursing home, Tana.
beds

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Gamv [v typed over w] ik Red Cross nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . 7 "
Mehamn nursing home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 "
Red Cross hospital, Kjoellefjord . . . . . . . . 8 "
"

"

"

Berlevag . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 "

Kjelvik Tuberculosis home. Hon, vag . . . . . 38 "
Red Cross Hospital . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 "
Hammerfest hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 94 "
St. Vincent Hospital, Hammerfest . . . . . . . . . 20 "
Hammerfest Mental Home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 "
Home, Alta.
"

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Karasjok tuverculosis[sic] home . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 "
Another one . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 "
Tuberculosis home with annex for children 83 "
. . . . . . . . . .
And at the end,
With regard to the medical institutions in Finnmark, these were
alltotally destroyed when the Germans withdrew with one exception
&ndash;Viz. &ndash; a small tuberculosis home in Nesseby,
Varangerfjorden. Withthe exception of the Vadsoe, so and so in hospital
in Vadsoe, there wastotal destruction of all hospitals.
There are a number of examples that the evacuation was carried outwith
great brutality and several tragedies were enacted. These werepartly due
to sick and old being taken from their beds and with aminimum amount of
clothing, being forced to board small vessels whichwere used during the
evacuation. Several desperate situations alsooccurred amongst those who
fled from the evacuation and hid in themountains. Many of these had no
opportunity to take sufficient clothingwith them. Some were expectant
mothers and there were even cases ofbirths
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taking place in Finnmarksvidda under the lost primitiveconditions in
bitter cold, without clothing and with very littlefood.
This seems to be the only place in which a complete scorched earthpolicy
was carried out under arctic conditions and in winter time.
(Signature) Karl Evang.
The next document, Your Honor, is page 71, page 68 of the German Document
Book. It has been marked for identification as Exhibit521-A, and it is
being offered now and submitted as Prosecution Exhibit521. This is a
letter from the statistical Office of Finnmark,addressed to the Supreme
Court Attorney Ivar Follstad, VictoriaTerrasse 7, in Oslo, dated February
25, 1947 and his subject: "Wardamages in the Finnmark and North Troms. It
states as follows:
. . . . . In answer to your letter of 18 inst. Town Council begs to state
as follows:
In connection with the claims of reparation by Norway on Germany theTown
Council has collected information on the war damages. Thoseinformations
are, however, not complete concerning the distributionof the damages on
the different districts, but on the basis of thematerial produced, the
Town Council has been able to put up thefollowing survey on the damages
especially as regard Finmark andNorth-Trome. The informations are partly
based on approximatecalculations and do pretend to be complete.
. . . . . . . . . .
DR. FRITSCH: I object to the submission of this documentas evidence. This
is information which cannot be checked atall. It is imp-ossible for the
defense to bring the Town Council fromOslo here and crossexamine them.
The Statements are notidentified. It is merely an indictment, and
therefore I would like thatthe objection be sustained
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JUDGE CARTER: It will be admitted for whatever the Tribunal may find it
to be worth.
. . . . . Regarding the most important items special information onthe
damages during the evacuation in the winter 1944/45 has not beenobtained.
Most of the damages are included in the war damage insurancefor buildings
and movables amounting to about 270 million Norway Krons,for all the
years of war. By contacting the War Damage Insurance youwill probably get
special informations about the damages due to theevacuation. The
informations on the damages on public harbour works as well as on the
fishing fleet are complete. The Town Councilhas no special information
about the part falling within the time ofevacuation.
Roads and bridges.
The road director has estimated the German destructions of roads
andbridges in the Finmark [sic] during the evacuation in the autumn
1944to approximately altogether 24.7 million Norw. Kr. of this about
11million Norw. Kr. for roads and 13.7 "
" " bridges.
Other war damages on roads and bridges in the Finnmark have not been
taken up especially. Telegraph and telephone.
The telegraph director has estimated the damage on stations(inclusive
radio stations) and on telegraph and telephone wires duringthe German
evacuation of the Finnmark and North Troms in the Autumn1944 to about
15.6 million Norw. Kr.
. . . . . . .
JUDGE CARTER: It appears the time for adjournment has arrived. We will
adjourn until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(Thereupon at 4:30 p.m. an adjournment was taken)

27 August-47-M-SW-1-1-Love
Court 5 Case 7
Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the matterof the
United States of America against Wilhelm List, et al,defendants, sitting
at Nurnberg [sic], Germany, on 27 August 19470930-1630, Justice
Wennerstrum, presiding.
THE MARSHAL: Persons in the court room will please find their seats.
The Honorable, the Judges of Military Tribunal V. Military TribunalV is
now in session. God save the United States of America and thishonorable
Tribunal. There will be order in the court.
THE PRESIDENT: The Marshal will ascertain if all defendants are in the
court room.
THE MARSHAL: May it please your Honor all defendants are present inthe
court room except Weichs who is absent due to high blood pressure.
THE PRESIDENT: If a certificate has been issued by the prisondoctor you
may hand it to the Secretary&ndash;General. You may proceed Mr.Rapp.
MR. RAPP: Your Honors please turn to Document Book XXIII, page73, page 69
of the German Document Book. We have reached the part ofthis page,
"Telegraph and Telephones" in the middle of the pageand we now come to:
"Harbors and Harbor works.
The port director has estimated the war damages on official bridgesin the
FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS DISTRICTS during the German evacuationin
the autumn 1944 to approximately . . . .2.2. million Norw. kr.
"In addition to this there are considerable damages on privatebridges and
quais. The amounts for these damages are included in thefigures mentioned
below by the War Damage Insurance for buildings(risks on industry and
civil risk).
"The Agriculture.

27 August 47-M-SW-1-2-Love
Court V Case 7
"The War Damage Insurance from buildings has estimated the wardamages on
houses and buildings in agriculture in the FINMARK and NORTHTROMS
districts to about . . . . 12 mill. kr.
"The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damageson
machines and farming outfits domestic animals, crop and furniture toabout
. . . . . . . .6 million kr." That is on page 74, your Honor.
"These figures are purely agriculture risks. All damages on the property
belonging to the fishing population have been enteredunder civil risk
below.
"The damages to the forests of the Finnmark and the
North&ndash;Tromsdistricts during the war, inclusive the devastation made
by the Germansduring the evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive
future losses due to exploitation of the forests, have been estimatedby
the Town Council to approximate . . . . . .25 mill. kr.
The Industry.
The war damages on industrial buildings in the FINNMARK and
NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage
Insurance to about . . . . . .38 mill. kr.
"The War damages on industrial movables in the FINMARK
ANDNORTH&ndash;TROMS districts have been estimated by the War Damage
Insurancefor movables to about . . . . . . . .5 mill. k4 [sic].
Houses and buildings, Movables, Civil Risks.
"The War Damage Insurance for buildings has estimated the war damages on
buildingsin the FINNMARK AND NORTH&ndash;TROMS (exclusive buildings has
estimated theagriculture and industry and those belonging to the state)
to about 114mill. kr.
The War Damage Insurance for movables has estimated the war damages on
general movables in the FINNMARK and NORTH-TROMS districts (farming and
industrial movables excluded)
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to about . . . . .94 mill. kr.
Stocks.
"The War Damage Insurance for stocks estimated in September 1945
theevacuation damages in the FINNMARK in the autumn 1944 to about . .
..18.4 mill kr.
The actual amounts are now considered 2&ndash;3 million Norw. kr.
toohigh, but if all war damages on stock in the FINNMARK for April
1940&ndash;May 1945 are taken into consideration, the amount can be
accounted for.The war damages outside the evacuation damages only
amounted to about2&ndash;3 mill kr.
Goods on board ships.
"The State Goods War Insurance estimates the war damaged on goodsonboard
ships in the FINNMARK during the evacuation in the autumn 1944to about .
. . . . . .1.2 mill. kr.
"Various war damages covered by private insurance companies are notto be
obtained in detail on FINNMARK. The amount of these damages is,however,
not estimated to be very high, considering the total amount ofdamages
claimed by all insurance companies together for reparation wardamages to
be about 16 million Norw. kr. for the whole of the countryand for all the
years of war.
Ships, freighters, larger and smaller fishing boats as well as all sorts
of small vessels.
"All smaller vessels at a value under 250 kr. were included in theWar
Damage Insurance as movables and amounts for wreckages and wardamages on
such boats in the FINNMARK ARE INCLUDED IN the amount of 94million kr.
under the item for movables above.
"By the State War Damage Insurance the amount of 1.9 million Norw.kr. was
mentioned as the sum that this institution has paid especiallyfor war
wrecked boats, but also for partial war damages
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during the war on boats having their basis in the FINNMARK and
NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts.
"The re-insurance institute for the fishing fleet, BERGEN statesthat the
amount of reparation costs paid by it for totally
war&ndash;wreckedfishing boats , etc. and for partial war damages on such
boatshaving their basis in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts
for allthe years of war amounted to a total of approximately 2 million
Norw.Kr. Perhaps the re&ndash;insurance institution is now able to give
moreexact information and especially also for the damages during
theevacuation.
"In addition to the two amounts mentioned here of about 1.9 millionNorw.
kr. and about 2 million Norw. kr. are amounts paid by the
privateinsurance companies for their insurance responsibility on war
damageson fishingboats [sic] and other boats. As mentioned above no
information hasbeen obtained about this last amount.
"When these above mentioned amounts are added [sic], the lump sum
isabout 360 million Norw. kr. for the war damages mentionedunder the
individual items. It is to be mentioned that thesedamages cover direct
war or direct destruction through war actions.Damages brought about in
connection with requisitions of houses andgrounds as well materials with
special reference to the exceptionalwear and tear following the German
use for houses and buildings,roads and bridges etc. and material
requisitioned is not included inthis amount.
"The amounts mentioned in most of the above are based on theinformation
presented to the Town Council during the war andimmediately after this
and they are calculated according to theprices before 9 April , 1940,
At present further additional amounts might have arisen by which the
final figures would have been still higher.
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"As a comparison it can be mentioned, that the informations receivedby
the Town, Council up till November 1945 represent the war damagesfor the
whole country including the total losses of ships preliminarilycalculated
to more than 3 billion Norwegian kroner.
Rubber Stamp: OSLO TOWN COURT
Signature: A.

Skien."

For your Honors' information and merely as a gratuitous comment, the
Kroner is now about five kroner to the dollar, at present.
On Page 80, this particular document dontinues and there we have aletter
dated 3 July 1947, signature: A. Roll-Mathiessen, Presented InOslo Town
Court. 3 July 1947:
"Central Bureau of Statistics
the Director
OSLO, 26 June 1947
NORWAY
Dronningens Gate 16
Telegram Adress [sic]:
STATISTIKK
Telegrams:
STATISTIKK
Your Ref . AS/NH
File No. 849/47
Supreme Court Attorney Mr. IVOR FOLIESTAD
Strandgaten 19
BERGEN.
Criminal case against General RENDULIC &mdash; concerning the ravages in
the FINNMARK 1944/45.
We are in receipt of your query of 20 ult, regarding informationon the
value of the real estate in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS before9
April 1940. For this reason, the town council has had a conferencewith
the authorities who supplied the information
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about the ravages before, and who have made a number of calculationsof
the total values before April 1940 for the different groups ofproperty in
the FINMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS.
The calculations are as exact as they possibly could be at the present
time, and the evaluation of land and ground has been kept apart as you
mentioned in your letter.
Subsequently the evaluation of property together with the estimationof
damages have been put up and a percentage of damage within thevarious
groups. The amount of damages according to 'the letter from thetown
council of 25 February this year, has in some cases been
correctedaccording to more recent and complete informations.
Buildings, furniture [r typed over m] and movables etc.
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As mentioned in letter of 25 February most of the damages in the
in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts are under the
wardamage insurance for buildings and movables amounting to about
270million Norw. cr[sic]. This preliminary figure has now been
correctedby the company to about 290 million Norw.er[sic]. The total
capitalon buildings &mdash; furniture and movables in these provinces in
April 1940can be stated to approximately 350 million Norw. c[c tyeped
over e]r. Thisamount comprises all houses, buildings, fire insured and
not fireinsured (inclusive municipal buildings but excluding the
buildings ofthe State, which have been entered under various items
below.Furthermore, it comprises all furniture and movables,
machines(immovable and movable), tools and implements, crops
andprofessional movables for agriculture (inclusive domesticanimals),
private bridges and quais, all small boats with a valuebelow 250 Norw.
cr. [sic] etc. The percentage of damage for the groupmakes about 83.
Roads and bridges
The total value on April 1940 of all roads and bridges which arepart of
the constructions of the road service as well asworkshops, tools and
stocks has been calculated by the Road Board toabout 80 million Norw. cr.
[sic] The damages of roads and bridgesduring the evacuattion [sic] in the
autumn 1944 which was formerlycalculated to about 24.7 million Norw. cr.
[sic] has now beensupplemented by 5-10 million Norw. cr. [sic] for
workshops,outfits and stocks (which had been extended considerably
duringthe war and which was almost completely damaged) to a totalamount
of about 33 million Norw.cr. [sic] or approximately 40% of thetotal
value. For the bridges damage was complete.
Telegraph and telephone.
The damage on stations (inclusive radio stations and air bases)
andtelegraph and telephone wires during the evacuation was
formerlyestimated to about 15.6 million Norw.cr. [sic] This preliminary
amounthas been corrected to about 20 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage
isreckoned to be total.
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Harbours and Harbour works.
The part director has formerly estimated the war damage on
publicbuildings (bridges belonging to the State, the port service and
thelocal port services) in the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS
duringthe evacuation to approximately 2.2 millionen [sic] Norw. cr.
[sic]as a supplement was made for buildings and storehouses etc.
belongingto the port service, which was not included before. The damage
isconsidered to be total.
Ships, freighters smaller and larger fishing boats.
The town counsil [sic] has calculated the boat property in theFINMARK
[sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS in Aril 1940 to approximately 16.5million
Norw. cr. [sic] (about 15 million Norw. cr. [sic] for somelarger boats
originating from HAMMERFEST, VARDO and VADSO.) [sic]
The total amount of damage for warwrecked and wardamaged fishingboats in
the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH-TROMS during the whole of the warhas been
estimated by the war insurance company for the fishing fleetto 2.9
million Norw. cr. [sic] If the value of the larger boats whichpractically
all have been wrecked, is added to this amount the totaldamage for this
group is approximately 4.5 million Norw. cr.[sic] or 27.5 of the total
amount of 16.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] Inthe letter of the town council
dated 25 February of this year, thedamages on this item are provisionally
calculated to about 4 millionNorw. cr. [sic]
Stores of goods and goods on board ships.
The town council has formerly given the damages under those items to
about 19.5 million Norw. cr. [sic] The damage was total.
Various war damages covered by private insurance companies.
These are not able&ndash;as mentioned before&ndash;to give any
informationfor the FINMARK [sic] and NORTH&ndash;TROMS provinces alone.
However, theamount for such damages will certainly not be very large, as
mentionedbefore.
The forests
The damages on the forests of the FINMARK [sic] and
NORTH&ndash;TROMSduring the war, including the devastation made by the
Germans duringthe evacuation in the autumn 1944 and inclusive future
losses due to the

Court V Case VII
27 Aug 47-M-2-3-GG-Love
exploiting of the forests, was formerly given by the town council
asapproximately 25 million Norw. cr. [sic] The assets of the forests
inApril 1940 are calculated to about 40 million Norw. cr. [sic]
whichresults in a percentage of damage of about 60%. The reason for
thepercentage of damages being so high is evidently, as mentioned
before,the fact that in the estimate of the damages the future losses
onaccount of exploitation of the forests is included.
In addition to the amounts mentioned above concerning the buildings of
the Stateas well as material etc. there are some amounts relating to the
powerstaotions [sic] of the State, the State's schools, personages,
postoffices etc. inclusive furniture, material and outfits
oftransportation. The evaluation of those buildings etc. on April 1940
iscalculated to about 5 million Norw. kr. and the damages during the
warand the evacuation to approximately 4.5 million Norw. kr.
If all the amounts referring to the individual items above, are added
together,the total evaluation of the property of the FINMARK [sic]
andNORTH&ndash;TROMS on April 1940 is about 530 million Norw.
kr.(exclusively the value of land and ground) and a total damage
ofapproximately 400 million Norw. kr. i.e. an average percentage of
damages of about 75%
signature: ARNE SKAUG
signature: A.

Skoien

Rubber stamp: Oslo Town Court.
Dronningens Gate 16,
telephone OSLO, 3 July, 1947
Telegram
Statistik [sic]
Your reference
Our reference HM/SF

DOCUMENT 4

Supreme Court Attorney Mr. IVAR FOLLESTAD Strandgaten 19,
BERGEN.
Criminal case against the General Rendulic &ndash; concerning the ravages
in the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS 1944/45.
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According to letter from the Norw. Govt. statistical office of 25February
and 26 June this year, some of the items of war damages forthe FINNMARK
and NORTH&ndash;TROMS districts are covering all damages duringthe war,
and consequently also the damages before the evacuation 1944/45.
To&ndash;day the Town Council has, however, obtained the
followingadditional information about the part of damages that is to
beattributed to the time before the evacuation and during the evacuation
Building, furniture and movables, etc.
In the letter by the Town Council of 26 June, the damages have beenput
down with a total amount of about 290 million Norwegian kr. Of thisamount
approximatively 50 million Norw. kr. cover the time beforethe evacuation
and 240 million Norw. kr. approximately the evacuationperiod. The
percentage for damages on buildings, furniture andmovables, etc. during
the evacuation then amounts to 70 ships, freighters, larger and smaller
fishing boats.
The Town Council has no information at present about the part of
theamount of damage of 4.5 million Norw. kr. falling within the time
ofwar before the evacuation. Still the damages before the evacuation were
of very little importance.
The forest.
The main part of the damages on the forests in the FINNMARK
andNORTH&ndash;TROMS districts, estimated to approximately 25 million kr.
fallsinto the time of evacuation. The damages before the time of
evacuationcan only be estimated to 2&ndash;3 million Norw. Kr.
Considering that theestimate of damages for the time of evacuation of
approximately 23.5 million Norw. kr., the percentage obtained is about
56%.
Supplement to the buildings belonging to the State as well as material,
etc.
The damages included in the amount of 4.5 million Norw. kr. Are only
concerning the tine of evacuation.
According to the additional information given above the total
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estimation of the damages for the FINNMARK and NORTH&ndash;TROMS forthe
time of evacuation is about 400 million Norw. kr. minus about 52.5million
Norw. kr. 347.5 million Norw. kr. or an average percentage ofabout 63% of
the total real capital on April 1940 of about 530 million
Norw. kr.
Signature: A.

SKIEN

If your Honors now please turn to page 17 of the document book, page19 of
the German document book. This document was offered foridentification
only as 516A. It is now being submitted as Prosecution
Exhibit 516.
I would like to call to your Honors attention that we have onlytranslated
excerpts of this letter from the City Engineer ofHammcrfest, but we have
furnished defense counsel with a completetranslation of such a letter.
The City Engineer of Hammerfest
The devastation of Hammerfest after the compulsory evacuation of the
population at the beginning of the month of November 1944.
____________
On Sunday 29 October it was proclaimed that "the population ofFinmark
[sic] was to be compulsorily evacuated immediately". The firstdistrict of
Hammerfest to be evacuated was Fuglenes&ndash;Storelven at thelatest
Holiday, 30 October, 1200 hours.
On Monday 30 October I called on the then Island Commandant liar
orGaedke&ndash;who simultaneously was Evacuation Commissar&ndash;in order
to find outwhat was to happen to the public utilities i.e., fire
department,water works, electricity works etc., I was together with
theAdministrator of telegraphy who wished to receive similar
informationconcerning telephone and telegraph. We were told that there
was nofurther use for the fire department. However, the water and
theelectricity works were to continue until further orders. I
askedwhether I myself should remain in the city and was told that of
course
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I did not have to evacuate. Then I stated the necessary number
ofemployees I required i.e. three engineers, one guard for the den of
theelectricity work and preferably three men for the water work.
However,the families of these people had to be evacuated because women
andchildren were not permitted to remain.
The fire department was given leave of absence. Some of them hadleft
already&ndash;they had been evacuated to the country previously withtheir
families-as had other inhabitants of the city.

Court V Case VII
37 Aug 47 3-1-M-GW^Maloy
"After the evacuation of the population was finished on 3November it
became possible in the course of the following week tocollect, pack up
and to send away all essential remaining firedepartment and air
protection material with the help of the persons whohad remained. This
material was collected from different places. All ofit was went away with
two freighters which had stayed there withevacuees and loaded diverse
goods.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"On 15 November when the General Horwegian [sic] Telegraph servicewas
supposed to be liquidated or terminated and the machines were to
bedismantled I telegraphed as a matter of orderly procedure to the
NorgesBrandkasse (Norwegian Fire Insurance). I told them that the
firedepartment had ceased to exist on 1 November and that according
torumors the city was to be destroyed entirely. . . . . . . . .
"The devastation of the city
The figures in parenthesis in the following refer to the enclosedmap of
Hammerfest 1:4000. This map shows the different areas orbuildings.
"As early as on the 5 and 6 November 3 farms in Fuglenesdalenand all
smaller buildings in the neighborhood of the city wereburned down and at
the same time also the houses in Soeroyesund&ndash;thearea along the
Akkerfjordweg to Sjaaholmen. &ndash;The building containingthe reduction
valves of the water works seemingly was mistaken foran ordinary dwelling.
It was burned down so that the valves were partlydestroyed packing wore
standing open. After the inspection theEvacuation Commissar
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was informed that the mains of the water works would freeze if a heavy
frost should occur which would put the works out of commission. . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"(2) On 22 November the first part of the city, the western part (Hauen)
&ndash;about 50 plots&ndash;were burned down. One or two buildings were
blasted in order to prevent the fire from spreading to other
buildings. At the corner of the cemetery in the street toward the
Krutthusstrasse a few small bombs and some burning wood had been
dropped. German soldiers were successful in removing all this with the
exception of one bomb which exploded and blasted a piece of tho cemetery
wall,&ndash;The burning down had started in the morning. About 9:00
o'clock I arrived at a place whore the German soldiers brought out hose
from a fire station to extinguish the fires. They wanted to prevent the
fire from spreading across the street toward the elementary school.
However, the keys for the hydrants, the connection for the hose etcetera
were missing, I then had to help to organize the extinguishing and were
now able to keep the fire from spreading. "During the following days all foundations of the burned down places were
blasted. There were still 10 buildings standing unharmed, west across
the Akkerfjerdweg. They remained until the last. . . . . . . . . .
"(5) On 16 December the settlement on Hammeren near
Fuglenesweg&ndash;(Mella) a total of 5 buildings was burned down.
house (Lockkos) down the road remained whole.

One
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"(6) On the 24 December (Christmas Eve) the houses near the old shooting
area near Stervannet, a single house in Breillia (Roy Pedersens) and a
few little barracks, the building on Einan and the Ilslageret were burned
down (for nothing).
"(6a) On 27 December the remaining houses in Breilia and the
Villa Nissens and the rest of the barracks around there were
down. On the same day probably also the buildings below the
were burned down. On 28 December the large Naval barracks on
Fuglenes were burned.

nursery, the
burned
power plant
Skansen

"On one of the first days of 1945 the buildings west of Stottabakken on
Fuglenes (5&ndash;6 houses) were burned down.
"(7) On 12 January 1945 the buildings east of Storelven were burned down
i.e. the entire Mella and Mellaplataa including the buildings on the spur
of Storelven from Storvannot. However, not the factory of Hauan with its
storage plant where cement was kept.
"(8) On 13 January 1945 all of Fuglenes, so to speak was burned down
excepting the steam operated factory of Feddersen &amp; Nissen and the
landing stages there and the two western buildings up above including
three houses in Fuglenesbugten. Still remaining are the buildings of the
coal depot of Robertson and the hospitals with the apartments for the
physicians and janitors.
"(9) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
"(10) The following were burned on 20 January: the remaining parts of
eastern city district between Storelven and Material&ndash; and Stenkuls
Kleminningen building on Battor iebakken up to and including the corner
building
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number 474 with the three houses in the back below the new sub-stations.
"(11) On the following days the main building of Robertson and the
packing houses in Fuglenes and the landing stages and buildings were
demolished. These belonged to the Finmark Canning Factory.
"(12) After the houses on the southwest side of Storvannet had been
evacuated (the Prohibited area) which had been requisitioned by the Naval
Commandant they wore all burned down and a newly erected bunker building
with tremendous iron concrete walls and iron concrete roof (broadcasting
station etcetera) was blasted.
"In connection with the burning down of the city all poles of the
electrical power lines were sawed down, the insulators were broken and
the wires were rolled up and sent away. Transformers and the equipment of
the transformer stations also were dismantled and sent away with German
ships. As early as 19 November 1944 the dismantling of unitII of the
power station was started after the old direct&ndash;currency generator
for 1890 had been taken away. Generator III with the switch table and
switches and the regulator of the turbine later was sent away by a German
ship. Further dismantling was unsuccessful.
"On 4 December the destruction of the high voltage power line
Porsa&ndash;Hammerfest was started. They left the poles a good meter
above the surface. The insulators were broken and the copper wires were
cut, tolled up and taken away. Usually it was cut off at each pole so
that the wire has only old metal value. I do not know what happened to
the transformer poles later.
"On 6 February 1945 I received orders to leave the city,
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together with all Norwegians and the German units and the Russian
prisoners. Only a small detachment of engineers (blasting detachment),
consisting of about 20 men and one lieutenant, and the evacuation
authorities and a Norwegian tugboat with two Norwegian engineers on board
remained. I received information from them concerning the fate of the
rest of the city which was confirmed by the Germans mentioned above whom
I met in Tromsee.
"(13) When we were in Haaja, fire was discovered in the district of the
elementary school. Its reflection was visible to the neighborhoof of
LoppA. All the remaining buildings in the center district of the city
from Krutthusgaten to the steamer landing stage were burning all night,
also all churches. A fresh southern wind prevailed. The German port
captain related that ‘unfortunately' fire had broken out in the Soldiers
Home on Sadel Street (No. 353, together with No. 49, where the blasting
detachment lived). It had been hoped that the church would remain but
the tower started to burn and the church also was lost. On the following
days the installation of the bunker depot was burned down and the crane
tracks were blasted as well as the salt silo. But the demolitions didnot
work out as successfully as they were planned. The hospitals with the
two apartments also were blasted and everything was levelled to the
ground. The other buildings of Fuglenes and in the western part of the
city and by the way some other houses - all of wood - were burned
down. The refrigeration plant and the administrative building of FFR both of them of iron concrete - were blasted.
"The steamboat landing stage also was blasted but later the tug had great
difficulty to break up the supporting pillars and here the blasting did
not seem to have the intended effect either.
"The bridges across Storelven and Svartelven were blasted. The crews
were prohibited from going ashore because mines had been laid. I wish to
add in this connection that two German members of the Organization Todt
(engineer Beer and one soldier) lost their lives on 24 January in one of
the many shelters of the civilian air raid protection
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(near Svartelven) where tread mines had been laid also. It seems that in
the main street as well as in all side streets which were open for
automobile traffic such mines were laid until the end.
"The power station with the remaining machines and transformers was
blasted on 5 February at 10:00 o'clock after the plant had stopped
functioning at 9:00 o'clock. It was alleged that afterwards the dam was
blasted and the pipe lines probably were blasted in some spots. All
transformer stations were blasted after the electrical apparatus and the
transformers had been dismantled and removed. The high voltage cables in
the stations were cut above the floor but they are believed to have
remained undamaged otherwise excepting near two blasted bridges.
"It is assumed that of the water work units the intermediate dam ....and
the installations of the reduction valves had been blasted - in any case
bombs had been brought there. Also a nine inch main line in the tubular
bridge across Storelven where depth bombs had been laid. It seems that
the line to Fuglenes was destroyed by the blasting of the bridge across
Svartelv and/or of the road near this bridge. The jetty on the city side
and the jetties on Fuglenes are undamaged.
"As stated above, after each burning the foundations, the smoke stacks,
etc. were systematically blasted and levelled to the ground. It seems
that the part of the city which was burned down after the sixth
represents an exception. There the blasting was started. It stopped
when the Germans suddenly left the city on 10 February 1945. Some smoke
stacks, etc. were left standing near the Oscars-Plass, elementary
school. It is possible that the Zentralkommandoplatz (iron concrete on
the first floor) also has been forgotten. It was covered by snow on 6
Feburary. On 10 February 1945 only the chapel in the cemetary remained
standing.
"Temporarily Oslo, 20 April 45, signed Kummeneje (City Engineer)."
The next page attached to it was:
"To the Population.
"It has been decreed that the compulsory evacuation of the popula-
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tion of Finmark will be carried out immediately.
"In Hammerfast this compulsory evacuation is to be carried out in the
following manner.
"The section Fuglenes-Storelven is to be evacuated by 12 noon Monday 30
October. People who do not go without delay to the Evacuation Office in
the City Hall, 2nd floor (tax office) in order to be assigned
transportation will be picked up by the" — there is an asterisk — "Police
and the Wehrmacht.
"The Evacuation Authorities.
"*) Changed later to ‘den vepnede makt' (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht)"
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JUDGE BURKE: Mr. Rapp, without indicating that the document you have just
read will have any ovidentiary value or will be accepted as having any
probative value, I am wondering about the ambiguity in the translation of
the second paragraph you have just read.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor is referring to "In Hammerfest this compulsory
evacuation is to be carried but in the following manner."
JUDGE BURKE: Yes. The apparent difference in being able to translate
the language as to whether they were evacuated by the police or
Wehrmacht, or by the Armed Forces, Wehrmacht.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I hove been advised that the insert was put in
there for the benefit of the Norwegian population to whom this particular
proclamation was addressed, and it in both instances means the same. In
other words, the word "den vopnodo makt" is the translation into
Norwegian of the German word "Wehrmacht", and that has been put in
parenthesis. I believe that is what you are referring to in the above
paragraph. If Your Honors permit me I would like to show you the
original, how it actually looked and was corrected.
"The time for compulsory evacuation of the next part of the city will be
published by proclamation.
The Evacuation authorities.
") Changed later to "don vopnode makt" (Armed Forces, Wehrmacht."
If Your Honor will turn now, please, to page 26, page 28 of the German
Document Book, Norwegian Doc. VI has been marked for identification as
Exhibit 523-A.
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We are submitting it now as Prosecution Exhibit 523.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I would like to ask the Prosecution who
Prouthun should be, whether the Prosecution asserts this is a subordinate
of the defendant Rendulic?
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, the individual Preuthun was an evacuation
commissionor appointeed by the then Norwegian Minister President
Quisling. The sole purpose of this document is to show that these facts
as contained in the document and reported within their own then Quisling,
Government did happen during the evacuation. Minister .-hist is minister
of the Government at that time, and Prouthun was evacuation commissioner
of some liasson position to the 20th Mountain Army.
DR. FRITSCH: I protest against the introduction of this document as
evidence, because I don't think that this evidence is relevant. It has
nothing to do with the defendant Rendulic.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, this is an allegation on the part of defense
counsel which we cannot concede. I think it has very much to do with the
defendant Rendulic, because it shoves what actually happened during the
evacuation, and it was found in the Quisling files of the NorwegianGerman puppet government at that time, and we feel it has strong
probative value, because it shows what occurred during the evacuation and
the date is fixed at the time, so that the defendant Rendulic was in
charge of the evacuation.
THE PRESIDENT: In the light of our previous rulings it will be admitted,
however, the Tribunal by that admission is not indicating what, if any,
probative
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value it will later give to this document,
MR. RAPP:

It is dated, Hammerfest, 3.11.44, 1655 hours,

To Minister W HIST
For information concerning situation stop SCHONER "Fortuna" 50 tons
loaded from Losbosby with 250 persons including Old Age Home and 10
persons confined to bed half frozen to death on dock stop Seventeen hours
to here stop Transport must be continued in the same manner stop The
people received warning two hours before, and were ordered not to take
along food or bedding since according to original German plan the men
were to walk from Bellefjord to Hammerfest stop
signed PREUTHIJN
MR. RAPP: Now, Your Honor, the last document in this Document Book 23,
you will find on page 33, It is page 36 of the German Document
Book. This was marked for identification as Exhibit 518-A, and it is now
submitted as Prosecution Exhibit 518. These are the charges of the
Norwegian War Crimes Commission before the United Nations War Crimes
Commission in London pertaining to the evacuation of the Province of
Finmark, Norway.
DR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, I protest against the introduction of this
document. This document has already been mentioned, and I reserved my
protest, because this is, as I have already said, surely an
indictment. The probative value, therefore, can only be as great as if
the prosecutive authorities here made some kind of an assertion. Any
kind of probative value cannot be gained from such an indictment.
MR. RAPP:

The defense counsel told us the same
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story yesterday, and I understand, the Tribunal told us at that time it
will be admitted for what it is worth.
MR. FRITSCH: Your Honor, a ruling was not made. Yesterday I merely
protested against the form of this document, and I was told that a
certification by Col. Follestad would bo submitted, and therefore I
reserved my further attitude.
MR. RAPP: Your Honor, I believe we mentioned yesterday this report was an
official Norwegian Government report.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Rapp, did I understand your statement that this was an
indictment, it was a part of some proceedings in England?
MR. RAPP: No, Your Honor, I mentioned that this is a report in the nature
of an indictment, or rather in the nature of charges. That is the
accepted way of the United War Crimes Commission. In other words, these
Government reports can only be accepted by the United Nations in the form
of those charged. They are not being submitted to the United Nations War
Crimes Commission merely in presenting the evidence as it appears without
the charges, and as such it was forwarded to us, and we picked it up as
an official Government report made up in the form of charges.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal is of the opinion it has no probative value
as far as this defendant Rondulic is concerned, and the objection will be
sustained and it will not bo admitted in evidence.
MR. RAPP: Then Your Honor we would like to have this document remain with
the identification 518-A; is that acceptable to the Tribunal?
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THE PRESIDENT:
MR. RAPP:

It

is

(Evand)

allright with us.

Mr. Fenstermacher will continue with Document Book 24.

MR. FENSTERMACHER: May it please the Tribunal, before beginning with the
presentation of the documents in Document Book 24. I would like to hand
to Dr. Laternser a copy of a memo which I received yesterday from the
Yugoslav delegation attached to the Office of Chief of Counsel for War
Crimes. The memo is addressed to me from Lt. Col. Svonimir Ostric, Chief
of the Yugoslav Delegation, It is dated Nurnberg, 26 August 1947.
"In connection with your inquity this delegation is informed by the
Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, as
follows:
1. "General Bader, Paul, is registered by the United Nations War Crimes
Commission in London as a war criminal. He is not in Yugoslav custody,
and the Yugoslav National War Crimes Commission does not know his present
whereabouts
2. "General Dandkolmann, Paul, was delivered to Yugoslavia by the
British Occupation Authorities in Germany and is now in Yugoslav custody
in Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
3. "General Fohn, Gustav, and General Schmidt Ritzberg are registered by
the United Nations War Crimes Commission in London, as war
criminals. They are not in Yugoslav custody and the Yugoslav National
War Crimes Commission does not know their present whereabouts.
4. "Col. Zollmeyer, Joseph is at present in Yugoslav custody, in
Belgrade Yugoslavia."<p style="text-align: center;">[....]
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[....]
DR. FRITSCH: [....] I would now like, with the permission of the
Tribunal, to turn to the problems of Norway. I have, for purposes of
identification, fixed a map on the wall here, a map of Norway. It is
unfortunate that I cannot submit a better map, but I think that, on the
whole, we don't need that map, and when we do, it will be sufficient.
Q General, how did your assignment in the Nordic area come about? I
think, to begin with, you were sent to Northern Finland. How did that
come about?
A In the Spring of 1944 the Finns had entered into negotiations with the
Russians, and these negotiations did not lead to any results. In June of
the year 1944 a Russian offensive had started. This had taken place on
the Southern Finnish frontier along Lake Ladoga and the Finnish
border. This offensive-had a number of successes in the beginning. The
moral in Finland had so far been quite a depressed one, and it was to be
expected that the Finns would enter into new negotiations with the
Russians. In this situation General Dietl had an airplane accident. Up
till then he had been the Commander in Chief of the XXth Mountain in
Lappland. General Dietl was a personality who was much
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esteemed in Finland. I believe all this took place on the 23rd
During the night, or the 24th of June, I received the order to
the 24th of June at the Fuehrer's Headauarters. On that day I
the post of the Commander in Chief over the XXth Mountain Army
Lappland.

of June.
report on
was given
in

Q What was the relation between Germany and Finland at that time?
A Germany and Finland waged a common war against Russia. The German
Mountain Army and the Finnish Army fought side by side on the Finnish
border. In spite of this there was no pact or alliance between those two
countries. The two countries only acted out of a common interest against
the common enemy on the basis of military agreements.
Q What was the military situation generally when you arrived in Finland?
A On a front of about 1200 Km East of the Finnish Eastern border there
was the XXth Mountain Army from the Arctic sea towards the middle of
Finland, and then came the Finnish Army. There was no common
leadership. The Finnish Army was led by the Marshal of Finland, Freiherr
von Mannerheim. The front of the Mountain Army was comparatively quiet. A
war of position of a normal kind was going on here. The Army itself was
stationed in two large groups, with two corps in the South of Lappland,
that is the middle of Finland; and one corps was on the coast of the
Arctic Sea. Between those two large groups there were no other
forces. The width and depth was 400 Km, and this area was rocky or
jungle-like. For all practical purposes it was not possible to cross it.
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Q Was this question of terrain which you just mentioned of any special
significance and importance concerning the battles and the later events?
A Yes, it was of quite decisive importance. In the whole area of
Lappland, which is the Northern part of Finland, and the area of my Army,
three-quarters of the country was covered with jungles, which could not
be negotiated. The area was rocky or swampy. Towards the North, up to
the Arctic Sea, there was tundra and entirely rocky areas. This was very
important considering the fact that the area could not be negotiated
because there were only very few roads in this area. In Lappland there
were, for all practical purposes, only three highways— the so-called
Arctic Sea highway which ran from North to South through Lappland and
which was about 600 Km long; and in the South of Lappland there were two
highways, each of which led to one of the corps stationed there. All
these highways met in Rovanjemmi, which is in Southern Lappland, a
locality near the polar circle and from there two roads led to the
Swedish frontier, to the so-called frontier highway which went along the
Swedish frontier to Norway to the Lyrgen fjords.
Q How did the political situation in Finland develop after all that?
A At the beginning of August the Finnish Government had resigned, and the
Finnish President had founded a new government. The head of this
government was Mannerheim. This government soon entered into new
negotiations with Russia. The Finns loyally informed us of this Pact. We
expected that this time the negotiations with the Russians would lead to
success. We expected that Finland would leave the alliance.
Q What would be the situation then confronting the XXth Mountain Army?
A The situation had necessarily to be extremely difficult if one
considers the fact that from the Arctic Sea, on the Eastern coast of
Finland, the front led down to the South and that in the centre of
Finland the German Mountain Army was joined by the Finnish Army, then in
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the event of Finland's leaving the alliance very suddenly a deep, open,
uncoverered flank would arise; which was 400 Km deep. This would be even
more dangerous because the best roads from Southern Finland, led to
unprotected road junction of Rovanjemmi, and to the Swedish frontier
highway. The loss of Rovanjemmi to strong Russian motorized forces and
that fact that these forces might reach the Swedish frontier highway,
which then led straight to Norway, had to lead to a catastrophe, for the
mountain army.
Q Where any provisions prepared for these events, and, if so, which ones?
A Naturally, everything possible was prepared. The proper forces were
withdrawn and put up in preparedness. We had to block the roads which
led from Southern Finland. We had to dynamite all bridges and mine the
roads to the greatest possible extent. All this we had to do to prevent,
wherever possible, the enemy breaking into the practically unprotected
flank of the army. Of course this could only be prepared in order not to
provoke the Finns and also possible not to provoke the Russians. But it
was prepared in the smallest detail.
Q Now, was anything known about the armistice conditions which were to be
expected on the basis of the negotiations?
A No, unfortunately nothing was known about this. We did know, from the
negotiations which had taken place earlier, that they had not been
successful because of two conditions which the Russians had imposed. The
first condition was that the Russians wanted to occupy Finland; the
second condition was that the Russians demanded that the Finns were to
fight against us. We tried to do everything to get clues about the terms
of the armistice because that would be extremely important to know in
good time. We were not successful in our attempts, and as late as the 2nd
of September, the day when the Finnish Army signed the armistice
conditions, I had a long talk with Mannerheim, in which, of course, we
did not discuss the armistice which was already a fact. But I thought
that I was right in the impression that the Finns would, this time,
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accept the condition to fight against us.
Q And how did the situation actually develop?
A On the 3rd of September the armistice between Finland and Russia was
concluded. Finland broke off all relations with Germany and demanded that
the German troops be withdrawn from Finland within 14 days.
Q Was this demand to withdraw the troops within 14 days feasible from a
military point of view?
A That demand could not be carried out. The demand obviously had the
purpose of forcing the Finns to fight against us. In order to evacuate
Finland, the troops had to carry out marches of 800 to 1000 Km—marches on
foot. This would have meant marching unceasingly for 5 to 6 weeks. Such
an enormous effort could not be expected of the troops in such a climate
and at that time of the year and in such a terrain as I have
described. The soldiers would have been able to bear up under this
effort, but the horses would not have been able to do it. And the
Mountain Army had very many horses because everything had to be carried
out on horseback. In addition we have to consider the fact that there
were many stores which had to be carried off, and, finally, we have to
consider that the troops just didn't march off like that. The enemy would
prevent them from marching off and involve them in combat actions which
actually did take place. The combat actions which took place, in order to
get the Mountain Army out of that area, took 5 to 6 weeks, and if one is
fighting one cannot, after all, march. It was more than three months
until finally the last man of the German Army had left Finland, and we
tried to expedite matters as much as we possibly could, especially in
consideration of the approaching winter.
Q General, you will remember that a representative of the Prosecution has
stated here that this period of 14 days was better than no time at all?
Would you consider that statement correct?
A Anybody who has any insight into the conditions of the roads there, the
fighting situation, and what the leadership of an Army needed, would
probably not make such a remark. Those 14 days to us only
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meant that we could evacuate to Germany the depots and the medical stores
which we had in Southern Finland. We could not do anything with these
stores there because we had so much that we didn't know what to do with
it all. After all, the Army had been provided for for a period of nine
months. These 14 days had no influence at all on the condition of the
Army; it had even less influence because the Russians did not feel
themselves bound by this time limit. They attacked already as early as
the 8th of September.
Q General, will you, very briefly, indicate the next event which occurred
so that we may gain a picture of the situation?
A As peculiar as this might sound, when we were concerned with a retreat
we were first of all, busily engaged in building up a new front, a front
with a depth of 400 Km. We succeeded in doing this in 4 to 5 days. Then,
we started transporting and evacuating. On the 7th of September the
first troop movement was carried out. We succeeded in withdrawing the two
Southern corps without the Russians knowing it. The Russians followed,
and from that date on they attached continuously. Crises developed. The
troops had already marched off had to return in order to relieve the
others. But, on the whole, our movement was successful. The obvious
purpose of the Russian attacks was to tie us and the Army down, to force
us to fight, and to destroy us with their superior forces. From the point
of view of military leadership the Russian actions vere entirely
correct. It was the Russian endeavor to use all available means to reach
the road junction of Rovanjemmi, in order to overtake us from the rear
and thus reach the highway near the Swedish frontier before we could. The
battle, to prevent this Russian intention, which sometimes lasted for
hours, meant to us existence or non-existence of the Army. And it
succeeded.
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Q Did the Russian attack now remain restricted to the Southern parts of
the Army?
A No, 3 weeks later an especially well prepared attack was made against
the XIXth Corps on the Arctic SeA.
This was a mistake on the part of
the Russian leadership, which was incomprehensible to me. It was a
mistake to carry out these two attacks at different times so that it
became possible for us to counter the Russian superiority by withdrawing
forces from the Southern group and putting them at the disposal of the
Corps near the Arctic Sea, and thus support this Corps. These forces
succeeded in relieving the XIXth Corps and getting it out of the Russian
encirclement.
Q General, is this the XIX Army Corps which was east of Kirkenes?
A Yes, this was the XIX Corps which was east of Kirkenes, about 150 Km
east of Kirkenes.
Q Who commanded it?
A The General of the Mountain Troops, Jodl, who appeared here as a
witness for the Prosecution.
Q And now when did the first order arrive to evacuate Northern Norway?
A To the best of my recollection that must have taken place towards the
latter half of September.
Q And how was this order carried out?
A We carried out this order very loosely. The Army order at that time,
was to retreat towards approximately the center of Lappland, and there to
halt. We felt strong enough to defeat all attacks in this position, and
we made this evacuation a voluntary one by supporting those Northern
Norwegians who wanted to get away,
Q Did this situation change later on, and, if so, for what reasons?
A This situation changed later for several reasons. Principally on the
4th of October we received an order saying that we were not to remain in
Lappland, but instead the Army was to be led back to a position near the
Lyngen-Fjord in Norway. That meant to us a movement of about
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800 to 1000 Km, which would necessarily last far into the Arctic winter.
Then when in October the attacks against the XIXTh Corps started we were,
after all, quite surprised that the Russians were in a position to
emphasize their great numerical superiority, even in that barely
negotiable terrain. And just around that date, a further order
arrived. The four best Mountain Divisions were to be sent to the
Continent, which meant more than half of the strength of the Army. These
were events which could not possibly have been anticipated, and they
naturally influenced our judgment of all problems at hand0
Q General, this order,—to distinguish between concepts which you
mentioned,—did the action which was to take place on the basis of the
order of the 4th of September have a code name?
A This movement was called "Nordlicht".
Q You were talking about the influence which became effective through the
new situation which confronted you?
A This influence was seen particularly in the fact that the Army could
not deny that the second evacuation order which had come in on the 20th
of October was fully justified. Only the OK was in a position to know
what would be demanded of the Army in the future and which forces would
be at the disposal of the Army for those purposes.
Q If you knew, a long time before the second evacuation order arrived,
the Russian strength and counted on the Russians' moving up on you, why
did you then not demand this order for evacuation and destruction?
A I never waited for orders which were a matter of course, and I never
asked for orders in matters which I thought I could regulate myself. I
knew quite well what I would have to do in accordance with the
situation. If I had not received this second evacuation order of the
28th of October, then I intended to concentrate the population in a
tolerable area of living space. The necessary sanitary installations
were to be left for them, but everything else—the quarters which would
have become available, the highways which existed, all bridges
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and harbor installations, and everything else-would have been destroyed.
The necessity of these measures was never doubted for a single instant by
anybody.
Q One question in between, General:
standard in a military respect?

Were the Russian troops up to

A In the extreme North the Russians had to have excellent troops because
the terrain and the climate were so very difficult, and because the
German and the Finnish troops which confronted them were some of the best
units which existed throughout this whole war. The Russians were
excellent fighters, especially in rocky and forest areas. Their special
units, such as the "Ski brigades," which were supplement by people from
Siberia, were excellent and they gave us considerable trouble.
THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn at this time until 9:30 tomorrow morning.
(THE COURT ADJOURNED AT 1630 to RESUME SESSION
at 0930, 31 OCTOBER 1947)
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Official Transcript of the American Military Tribunal in the
matter of the United States of America against Wilhelm
List,
et
al,
defendants, sitting at Nurenberg,
Germany,
October 1947, 0930.
Judge Burke, presiding.
THE MARSHAL:

on 31

Persons in the courtroom will please find their seats.

The Honorable,
the Judges of Military Tribunal V.
Military Tribunal V
is now in session.
God save the Unites States of America and this
honorable Tribunal.
There will be order in the courtroom.
THE PRESIDENT:
Mr. Marshal, will you ascertain as to whether or not
all the defendants are present in the courtroom?
THE MARSHAL: May it please,
Your honors,
all defendants are present
in the courtroom except the defendant von Weichs, who is still in t he
hospital.
THE PRESIDENT:

Judge Burke will preside at

this session.

JUDGE BURKE: You may proceed, Dr. Fritsch.
LOTH R. RENDULIC
DIRECT EXAMINATION (continued BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q
General,
when we
stopped we were discussing the
question of
Norway.
I had asked you yesterday to give us a picture about the
strength of the Russian forces and you told us they were technically
and numberically superior to your forces; how did you imagine the
Russians would follow you up?
A
There were two possibilities as to how this could be done.
First
of all it was possible they could push on up Highway 50, which led
from Kirkenes via Tana,
then it was possible that they would move
along the highway via Voalov and finally there was the possibility to
follow along the so called Frontier Highway alon the Finnish Swedish
frontier.
Q
General, would you be kind enough to look at the map and show us the
most important points on it?
A

One possibility would be to push up along Highway 50
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Q At this opportunity may I point

out

to

the Tribunal that

that

is

the highway which the Tribunal saw and used when it went to
Norway,
along Kirkenes
to Hammerfest.
A

Then it was possible to use the ro a to Ivals, which joined

Highway 50. T he third possibility was to push along via Rovanjemmi,
along the Swedish Frontier Highway to to the Lyngen Fjord. Those were
the three possibilities on the land route. A further possibility was to
push up also by a sea operation, which we started in the area Murmans,
which is roughly about here. (indicating.) The most suitable places for
landing were the Fjords of Alta and Vorstwanger in the Southern part of
Finnmark. In to this area the roads lead from Finnland, which the Finns
could have used on the land route.
Q
You are talking about landing operations, General;
the possibility of such landing operations?

did you count on

A
Landing had a great deal of advantage for the enemy, because to
march through those grey districts in winter time on through the whole of
Finnmark is extrememly strenuous, and the Russians could have saved
themselves this effort if they had carried out a pursuit operation at
sea, which would have been considerable more simple. Such an operation
had to be anticipated. The OKW also expected landings, even from the
British, and they thought they would take place somewhere near Narvik,
and at least half a dozen times we were told the opinion of the OKW
concerning those landings. That can be frequently found in the War Diary
of the Army which arrived here from Washington.
Q
Were the pre-requisites for such a landing good for
such a landing as you expected would take place?

the Russians,

A Yes, we knew that in the Kola Bay there was a great number of
ships, hundreds of thousands of tons which were part of the convoys which
came through the Artic Sea to Murmansk about twice a month. Those were
convoys of about 50 to 60 freighters, protected by battleships,
destroyers, aircraft carriers, and other auxiliary vessels. The Kola Bay
was reconnoiteved towards the end of September. We saw a great number of
ships,
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battleships, cruisers, aircraft carriers, etc., and these, without doubt,
were British vessels, because it was wll known the Russians only had one
battleship in the Artic SeA.
Q General, if I mention to you the figure 230,000 tons of shipping,
which I found in one Diary, so said to have been assembled in the Kola
Bay, would that be sufficient to carry out a large landing operation?
A Yes, 230,000 tons, can undoubtedly transport six to eight divisions,
but this number of tons reported here is not the maximum of what the
Russians would be in a position to use, because twice a month another
convoy of 100,000 to 200,000 tons of convoy vessels arrived in the Kola
Bay. Also we learned towards the end of September or beginning of
October, (I don't remember the exact date, its in the War diaries). We
learned that these convoys, which up until then had been sent by the
Russians with British support, were led by the British admirally from the
end of September onwards, and a landing operation would have been
supported through the fact that the allies had in the extreme North
undoubted supremacy on Sea and in the air, and those were the best
prerequistes that they could possibly have for a landing.
Q

Were there other factors as well?

I am mainly thinking about the question of Swedish neutrality;
neutrality; did you in this respect have to anticipate any difference?
A Yes, we had to anticipate a violation of Swedish Government, moved one
infantry division through Sweden to Haparanda, near the Finnish
Frontier. It could not be expected that the Swedes would resist Russian
pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes to do the same as we had
demanded from them in 1941. In that year we had, with the consent of the
Swedish Government, moved one infantry division through Sweden to
Haparanda, near the Finnish Frontier. It could not be expected that the
Swedes would resist Russian pressure if the Russians demanded the Swedes
to let them do the same as we had demanded. Of course, that could only
been an operation of secondary importance which would have been directed
against the area near
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Narvik. The main operation was to be expected as against Southern
Finnmark.
Q

In Southern Finnmark is a landing operation dependant on the season?

A
No, it is not dependent on the climate, because under the influence
of the Gulf stream the fjords do not freeze up.
Also there is not very
much snow in those districts in winter, but it is quite cold. It was
known that the Russians as well as to the Finns were extremely
wellequipped for this winter climate.
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Q General, if I may summarize your statements, you said that the Army
found itself in an extremely difficult position; did the difficult
position have any effect on the morale of the troops?
A Yes, it had a considerable effect on the morale of the
troops. Everybody was aware of the difficulty of the position. From
censorship of soldiers mail we learned that the morale of the soldiers
sometimes bordered on panic. We found letters written by soldiers in
which they said that a "second Stalingrad is in preparation", "the Army
is doomed", "When we freeze in with the Artic winter we will freeze as
Russian prisoners".
Q Did the Russian propaganda and if so to what extent, make use of this
situation?
A The Russian propaganda made very clever use of this situation. Above
all they tried to make the men distrust their leaders. Very soon after
Finnland left the allies by radio as well as by leaflets they spread the
news that the Commander in Chief of the Mountain Army was an Austrian and
he wanted this Army to fall into the hands of the Russians but this fact
was discovered and his withdrawal and dismissal was to be expected. In
connection with the events of 20 July 1944 and the consequences of this
event, which had only happened a short time before, this propaganda found
fertile soil. There was a very dangerous crisis amongst the soldiers
especially with regard to confidence in their leaders which could have
led to a catastrophe if the Army or parts of it came into difficult
situations. In order to counteract the effects of the Russian
propaganda, Hilter, on the 17 September, decorated me with the Golden
Cross of Honor, and thus the effect of the propaganda was counteracted
immediately.
Q General, when were you convinced that the Russians would not push up
on the land route via Northern Finnmark?
A I cannot tell you exactly when I became convinced of that fact.
assume it was towards the latter part of November.
Q

Well, what was it you ascertained at that time?

A

It had become known that the Russians had only followed us

I
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up past the Krkenes with weak forces. At first however, we had to assume
that he wanted to wait and gain time in order to allow things to settle
down and to consolidate his forces, after many weeks of hard fighting,
which had cost him many losses, and as one is apt to do as a rule when
one prepares a new operation.
Q Was it possible to reconnoiter the
Russian positions so that you could be informed about them?
A During the decisive period of time as of the middle of November, for
practical purposes it was no longer possible to reconnoiter. The
airbases had all been transferred to Norway. The nearest one was in
Butevos, which is about 1,000 kilometers distant from the Murmansk
railway. Aroundthat time daylight lasted only a very few hours each
day. The Artic night had already extended over the majority of the 24
hours. Wherefore, in such a great distance for a flight and with the
very short period of daylight, it was not possible to reconnoiter the
movements along the Murmask railway thoroughly.
Q General, would you be kind enough to show us on this occasion the
distances on the map?
A Butevos is here. (indicating) I would like to point out at this
point, Your Honor, that in Butevos we had in themeantime mad an interim
landing. That would have been the distance of the approae for
reconnoitering the movements along the Murmansk railway.
Q Therefore, you would have had to fly over Sweden and Finnland [sic] and
would have had to fly around this area?
A We would have had to fly over the whole of Finnland. [sic]
Q When was it certain to you that Russia had withdrawn forces from our
former Lappland Front?
A The first news concerning this fact was received towards the beginning
of December. It was a communication from the Army Group North which was
stationed near the East Prussian Frontier, and it had been confronted by
a division which up to that time had confronted my front in Lappland. We
did not receive any further news concerning any other
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forces. My front in Lappland faced about 30 Russian divisions, and the
Finnish Front faced the same number. These forces would have in any case
been far too strong in the very restricted area in Finnmark The
withdrawal of forces from the Lappland area could not give us any
information concerning the real intents of the Russians in Finnmark. How
many forces the Russians actually did withdraw never became known to us,
and I do not know it to this day.
Q And for what reason did you after that period continue the evacuation
and the destruction?
A The evacuation had, at that date, been actually carried out for all
practical purposes. The report concerning the evacuation is dated the 25
November. Therefore, it can be assumed that around that date it had been
concluded. The destruction which was carried out also in the Southern
area of Finnmark had to be continued, because moving up on Highway 50 was
not the only possibility which was open o the Russians. The even more
likely operations as of November would have been a landing in Southern
Finnmark.
Q Why were the destructions which you
villages along Highway 50?

carried out not restricted to the

A At first sight one might suppose that marching troops would only need
localities along the march route for quarters, but that is not the
case. Even in the districts which are densely populated there were and
are many villages, like for instance, in the center of Russia.
The
villages along the march route were never sufficient for the
accommodating of the marching troops.
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Instead these troops had to use also those places which were a good
distance away from the march route, and they had to take into account the
great strain of the march, when it was necessary to quarter them in
houses, et cetera, and that would have undoubtedly been necessary at that
time in Finnmark because of the climate. If the weather is good those
extra marches can be saved by spending the night in tents right on the
road.
DR. FRITSOH: May it pleast [sic] the Tribunal, I would like to submit a
photostat of this map for information purposes because it is rather
difficult to see the map.
Q. General, how about inhabited location along the coast and along the
fjords?
A. The inhabited localities along the coast and along the fjords were of
the same significance. One has to consider the fact that Highway 50 led
partly immediately along the coast and partly was very near the
coast. It further has to be considered that an army does not only march;
it also has to live, especially when it is supposedto prepare an
attack. Then the army is apt to spread over the whole country. Not only
the troops have to accommodated but there are also many installations to
be taken care of such as work shops, hospitals, depots, installations for
supply; and for all these installations everything that was there
concerning houses, et cetera,was necessary to accommodate all these
operations and that was the military significance of the apparantly [sic]
far distant inhabited localities.
Q. Did that also apply for the fishing villages which were way up in
Norway?
A. Yes, the same fact applied to them. As a rule, they could only be
reached by the cutters or boats. These were the most important means of
transportation in the district.
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We also had out bases in the fjords in those isolated localities and we
maintained communication with them by boats.
Q. I would not like to talk about the one specific place and that is
Hammerfest. Will you please tell us the significance of Hammerfest?
A.
We worked through all the possibilities which the enemy had
concerning landings. On that occasion we again and again were confronted
with the fact that Hammerfest would be the best point for supply for
troops which had already landed. It would be a good starting point and
woud be a good place for distributionfor the more detailed supplies to
other landing points in the fjords. Further, Hammerfesst was situated in
the vicinity of Highway 50. In order to get there all one hadto do was
to cross the narrow Kvaenangen Fjord and then one had an excellent
road. The place itself could accommodate a strong regiment or even a
division if necessary. This double significance of Hammerfest was a fact
for an enemy in pursuit. You must not think that we destroyed wantonly
or senselessly. Everything we did was dictated by the needs of the
enemy. That was its necessity.
Q.

And what was your attitude now toward the evacuation order?

A. I was fully aware of the facts of this evacuation order on the
population that I also knew that the execution of the evacuation would
mean a considerable burden to the army. In spite of this I had to obey
the order. Concerning the necessity of carrying out destructions, my
opinions coincided with the opinions of the OKW. It was a matter of
course to me and everybody else that the destructions had to be barried
out. My opinion deviated from Hitler's opinion in
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the beginning only in the one factor. I did not think it was absolutely
necessary to transfer the population to other areas but I could not close
my eyes to Hitler's reasons of military necessity. I could deny that
they were justified. Jodl warned me too. He said this time I had better
follow the evacuation order since Hitler insistedunder all circumstances
that this order be carried out. Furthermore, I knew -- and this is also
contained in the OKW order -- that the most decisive factor in this whole
affair was the Reich Commissar in Norway. It was well know that he, this
man, was very angry because the first evacuation order had not been
carried out and bow he would closely supervise all activities of the
Army. It was therefore quite impossible not to obey this evacuation
order. Finally, I had to tell myself that it would possiblybe better for
the population to be transferred to other areas rather than to spend the
hard winter in the destroyed country. I participated in bother winter
battles in Russia.
Therefore, I know what flight from cold means. I
had to realize that the Russians, if the pushed up on us and if the
confronted the choice of either saving themselves by using what remained
in the way of shelter of sparing the population, it was certain that they
would not spare the population. Therefore, in the final analysis it was
the best thing for the population that they were removed.
Q.
You were talking about the Reich Commissar for Norway.
give the name of this man, please?
A.

His name was Terboven.

Q.

That is the same Terboven whom you have already named?

A.

Yes, he is.

Will you
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Q.

General, what were the measures you ordered for the evacuation?

A.
I have to say something else first. The operation which had to be
carried out by the army was possibly the most difficult land operation of
the whole war. During those days I said to my Chief of Staff: "If
sometime after this war you have to train general staff officers, then
you will have to make this operation a basis of the training because it's
impossible to think of anything more difficult." The army was spread
over an area of 500 kilometers. That is, it was spread over a wiser area
than, for instance, the Allied forces in France and these forces were
more than a million men strong. The problem was to relieve this army out
of an encirclement from three sides and that, in battle with a superior
enemy. Then this army would have to be concentrated on two highways and,
finally, it would have to march along only one highway. All that would
have to be done on foot and in the Arctic winter.
That meant an
enormous task for my staff, a more difficult task cannot be imagined. I
could not burden ir further with the extensive work concerning the
evacuation. Therefore, I formed a special staff for this operation -that is, the evacuation.
Q.
General, can you indicate to us on this map the area over which the
Army was spread?
A.

No, I am afraid I can't.

The whole eastern part is missing.

Q.

You said the eastern part of that area is not contained on the map?

A.

Yes, that is what I said.

Q.

Did the evacuation staff receive definite directives?

A.
It received certain instructions mainly with respect to cooperation
with other agencies of the Wehrmacht
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and with the Norwegian government. I am afraid I don't know any details,
that was the work of my Chief of Staff. All I know is that I emphasized
particularly that the evacuation had to be carried out with all the
consideration for the population. Around that time I had learned
unofficially for some time that after the army had went back to Norway I
was to take over the post of Commander-in-Chief ocer [sic] Norway and
immediately after the evacuation order I received the official order for
this transfer. I attached the greatest importance to good relations
between myself and the Norwegian population. For this reason alone I
insisted that the evacuation whould [sic] not give any cause for
misgivings amongst the population. You may also rest assured that if any
kind of excuses became known to me, any unnecessary harshness or any
inconsideration, I would have taken counter-measures immediately. I was
not a man who would let himself be prevented from carrying out his
intentions by some action of a subordinate agency.
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Q, General, I will now have Document Book XXII shown to you. Would you
like to turn up page 1 in your book there which is also page 1 of the
English text? This is Document NOKW-1776. It is Exhibit 500. This is
an excerpt from the OKW order to return to Norway for good. Up to this
date the army had been under instructions to remain in Northern
Lapland. This excerpt contains the order for the destruction of all
installations which might be of use to the enemy. Would you please look
at the third paragraph? There is it ordered that the able bodied
population of Norway is to be taken along and to be put at the disposal
of the Reich Commissioner for Labor Assignment. I want to know from you
whether this part of the order and the part of the next paragraph - that
is, the carrying along of Finnish hostages - were these parts of the
order carried out?
A.
Q.

No.
Would you continue, please?

A.
The handing over of the able bodiespopulation [sic] to the Reich
Commissioner for labor never actually took place. That was an order
issued from the "green table' which wasgiven [sic] without knowledge of
the situation, and where carrying along of Finnish hostages is concerned
I can only tell you that we laughed about this part of the order. That
was completely out of the question.
Q.
Would you now in this same document book look at the following
document which is Exhibit 501. This is document NOKW-114. It can be
found pn page 3 of the German and page 4 of the English document
book. This is an order by the army addressed to the 19th Mountain Army
Corps. What was the purpose of this order and why was it necessary?
A.
The order ordered the destructions in the so-called Potsame
territory, this is the eastern area in Northern Lapland. This area had
to be coded by the Finns to Russia in 1944. Today this are is Russian
territory. The order further states that reconnaissance has to be
carried out concerning destructions in Norway. These measures were a
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matter of course, they did not have to be ordered.
Q.
Now, General, would you like to have a look at the following
document which is Exhibit 502. You fin it on page 4 of the German
document book and on page 6 of the English text. This is Document NOKW097. Here the Army makes certain applications and requests to the
OKW. Can youtell us why this was done?
A.
On the 4thof October, the Army received the order to retreat to
Norway. This task required quite a number of preparatory measures as,
for instance, the subordination of those troops in Finnmark which up to
that date had been subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief for
Norway. Further, there was another factor which I would like to point
particularly. An agreement was to be reached between the army and Navy
High Command for Norway. The Army did not ask for subordination but
merely an instruction concerning cooperation and there was never any kind
of subordination. We cannot assume that the OKW would do more than the
Army asked them to do. Besides, in paragraph 4 we find the request to
issue instructions concerning the destruction of the nickel works,
Kelloskioki. These instructions had to be given because after all these
works were not under the army but under the armaments ministry. Finally,
in paragraph 5 there is a request to the effect that the Quartermaster
General of the 20thMountain Army by appointed Evacuation Commissar. I
would like to point this out because the English word "evacuation" does
mean evacuation, but had nothing to do with what we meant in that
particular instance when we talked about the evacuation of the
population. This evacuation was not concerned with human beings, but
only with the property of the armed forces. Around this date, the 5thof
October, there was no such thing as the evacuation order existed.
Q.
Would you now look at the next exhibit which is 503? You find it on
page 6 of the German and page 8 of theEnglish [sic] document book. This
isdocument -- I beg your pardon-- I withdraw this remark. It is -- I
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have a correction in my book concerning the document number. I shall
mention the corrected document, No. 754-PS. This document, General, is
the Fuehrer order for the evacuation of population dated 28th of
October. You told us quite a number of things about the principles for
this evacuation. Now I would like you to give us once again your
comments on this order, and I want to particularly stress the question of
the difference between this order and the one previously given.
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A.
In this order it is stated that Finnmark be evacuated and
installations there be destroyed. It can be seen from this order that
the Reich Commissar was the man mainly respnsible for this order. The
military necessities are emphasized, the necessity for the evacuation, as
well as the destruction. There is one sentence which I would like to
draw to your attention. It is the last sentence in the second paragraph,
and it reads: "Compassion for the civilian population is uncalled
for." This sentence should not be regarded as an invitation to take
harsh measures. It is to be understood in connection with the next
sentence, which is the first sentence of the next passage, where it says,
"The troops carrying out this order must be made to understand that
within a few months the Norwegians will be thankful for having been save
from Bolshevism etc., and that the whole operation is in the interest of
the Norwegians." It had to be expected that the people would be kind and
would comply with the requests of individual Norwegians to exempt them
from evacuation, and that these men would not know that thus they would
face a deathly danger. There is one think which I can add here, and that
it that there was an oral explanation of this order to the effect that
Hitler attached particular importance to the measures ordered for
Finnmark because he counted on the Exile Government's landing and
settling in Finnmark, if this area was left completely intact. At this
occasion I received the warning from Jodl which I have previously
mentioned. The warning was to the effect that this time I had better
carry out the evacuation, and it was pointed out to me that the Reich
Commissar played an important part in this affair.
Q.
In order to clarify this complex, which was this evacuation
order? Was it the first or the second order?
A.

This was the second evacuation order.

Q.
Now, on this page o of your Document Book and on page 10 of the
English Document Book XXII, you find a document under Exhibit No.
504. This is document No. NOKW-086. This is the order issued by the
Mountain
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Army for the evacuation. Would you, first of all, give us your comments
on the distribution list?
A.
Yes, this is my order, issued by me for the evacuation. The
distribution list shows the following: This was issued as an order to
three corps. They were the corps connected with the evacuation. It went
to the most southern corps for the information, this corps had no
connection with the evacuation. The fourth copy went for information
purposes to the air Force and to the Navy. These two agencies were not
under the Army. And it went for information to the Armed Forces
Commander Norway and to the Reich Commissioner for Norway, and these two
agencies were, of course, not subordinated to the Army either.
Q.
General, would you now give us some individual comments on this
order, particularly would you please answer the following question? Is
this order identical with Hitler's order?
A.
This order was composed on the basis of Hitler's order, and of
course, it is in the nature of things that it contains more details that
Hitler's order did. Under passages one and two, the communication which
was given in Hitler's order isreproduced [sic], and i would like to say
the following in this connection: According to our regulations point one
of every order had to contain the enemy position. Point two was to
reproduce the order by the superior agency as literally as possible. In
this instance there wasno [sic] enemy and, therefore, the communication
contained in the original order was reproduced in passages one and two as
literally as possible. Apart from this the order contains general
directives for the carrying out of the evacuation. There are a few
details here which I would like to point out as, for instance, that only
people able to carry out the marches are to be put on treks. Therefore,
the order was not given in the way it might be assumed from those papers
which we received from Norway, that people were herded together and were
just driven down Highway 50. But instead it gives here quite a number of
welfare measures for the benefit of the population. These were
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then explained in detail in the first evacuation orders of the Evacuation
Staff which I signed myself. This order is, unfortunately, not amongst
these documents. There is something I would like to point out from
passage six, and that is that the ships which were used for the
evacuation were property of the Reich Commissar,assit [sic] is expressed
here. There were quite a few disagreeable matters there as can be seen
from the Norwegian documents, but the Army had no influence on these
ships. I would particularly like to emphasize passage seven. This point
states my intention and my wish for the evacuation to be carried out. It
says here, "I request all officessconcerned [sic] to carry out this
evacuation in a sense of relief action for the Norwegian
population. Though there be necessities here and there to be severe all
of us must attempt to save the Norwegians from Bolshevism and to keep
them alive." A person who orders something like this cannot desire
cruelty and ruthlessness, but I am not in a position to put a general
next to every lance corporal to make sure that the orders are carried out
in a proper way.
Q.
General, will you not please turn to the next exhibit - Exhibit No.
505? This is also contained in Document Book XXII, on Page 12 of the
German text and pages 14 of the English text. This document is numbered
NOKW.48. It is a "top secret" document. Did you have anything to do
with this matter, General?
A.
This is an order by the OKW, addressed to the Supreme Commander of
the Navy. This order shows that the Commander in Chief of the Navy
receivedthis order on the 30th of November 1944. Therefore, this order
had to be dated prior to that date, that is the 30th of November. The
order contains a number of directives and instructions to the Armed
Forces Commanders in Norway and Denmark, concerning the achievement of
several measures with the Reich Commissars. All I wanted to say in this
connection is that this order could not have anything to do with me
because I did not become Armed Forces Commander for Norway until the 18th
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of December of that year. I neither gained knowledge of this order, not
did I carry it out in any respect.
Q Would you now please turn to page 14 of your Document Book, which is
Page 16 of the English Document Book? This is Exhibit 506, and the
Document is No. NOKW-090. General, this is the evacuation report
"Hormann." We did not want to go into the details of this report because
it is known to everybody, but please turn to page 5 and have a look at
paragraph 4, which is contained on that page. There is some talk here
about a shelling of village of Kjoalle, which is supposed to have been
carried out by the units of the Navy? Was there a relation of the
subordination of the Navy under the XXth Mountain Army?
A No, the Navy was in no respect subordinate to the XXth Mountain
Army. This shelling of the village I cannot imagine, even on the basis
of this report, could, at the best, have because known to me after the
fact on the basis of this report, but I did not remember the incident
conderned here. I don't know what the report is talking about. The
Norwegian document show one incident where a Navy vessel fired on some
people with machine guns, and one woman was killed on this
occasion. Maybe it is this incident that is meant here. I don't know
any details. In any case, this naval unit was not subordinate to me.
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Q.
We will not turn to Document Book XXIII. Do you have the Document
Book there, General? Please turn to page 13 in your Document Book, which
is page 12-- one, two, in the English text. This is Exhibit 514, which
is Document Norway 4. It is a communication to the Corps Headquarters of
the XXth Mountain Army. Would you please give us your comments on this
communication?
A. A divisional commander comments here on the possibilities of the
evacuation. The letter is dated the 29th of October 1944. It is strange
that this communication has a receipt stamp of the XIXth Army Corps,
dates teh 31stof December 1944. The XIX Corps had been frequently on the
move during that period, and I can only imagine that this communication,
which is of no particular importance, for delayed and never actually,
reached my knowledge.
Q.
In this same Document Book would you please turn to page 30, which
is page 28 of the English Document Book. This is Document Norway 8, and
it has been submitted bu the Prosecution as Exhibit 517. It is a report
dated the 4th of January 1945. Will you briefly five us your comments
please?
A.
Is is a report from a dicision to the XIXth Corps. This report did
not go any further than the XIXth Corps, and, therefore, I did not gain
knowledge of it. The purpose of the report was to gather material to
counteract the strong radio propaganda from abroad, directed against the
so-called atrocities of the evacuation. I can only say that I subscribe
to every line of this report. All I would like to point out particularly
is page 2 of the report, which shows clearly that the town of Hammerfest
was almost completely evacuated on the basis of voluntary
applications. On page 3, which is page 30 of the English text, it is
pointed out that the BBC asked the Norwegian population not to comply
with the evacuation order, but instead to withdraw into the valleys and
there those people would have died. In the next passage it is mentioned
that one attempt had been made to find the people who had been left
behind and that they were then evacuated. There is some talk here about
relief
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actons for those who had remained behind. Of course those actions were
reported in the Norwegian reports, but they were distorted by
hatred. The term "relief action" for this population was used in the
same manner by the Norwegian witness here, General Dahl, because he too
had exhausted all his activities in such relief actions for those parts
of the population which had escaped the evacuation. There is nothing
else I have to say.
Q.
General, this brings us to Exhibit 519, which is on page 54 of your
Document and on page 60 -six, zero- of the English Document book. This
is Document Norway No. 10. It is the proclamation to the population for
evacuation which has been repeatedly mentioned here. Who drafted this
proclamation?
A.
It was drafted by the Reich Commissar in Oslo. My staff was asked
by telephone for my agreement, and I was asked to sign my name on the
document. And, of course, I could not refuse this request, particularly
since there is nothing illegal contained in this proclamation. I would
like to point out that the third passage of the proclamation has not been
translated in the English document book and this passage reads as
follows: "The German occupation Authorities for this reason show
themselves prepared to support the evacuation carried out by the
Norwegian Government. It will be supported with all means at the
disposal of the German Agencies.
Q.
Then, will you please turn to page 83 in your Document Book -eight, three, which is 89-- eight, nine--of the English text. This is
Exhibit 522, Document Norway No. 13. It is an Order of the Day where you
make it known to the troops that you have taken over the post of the
Commander in Chief of Norway. You were charged with this order under
Count 2. Will you please give your comments on it?
A.
Will, I don't see
announce to the troops
been made Armed Forces
that this be done. In

why I am charged with it. All I do here is to
and to the other command authorities that I have
Commander of Norway, and it is a matter of course
such orders, which are rather formal, it is
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common usage to conclude then with, "Long Live the Fuehrer." That is
done in all countries. I don't see what is interesting in this.
Q.
Now, let us turn to Exhibit 512, which on page 5 of the German text
and page 4 of the English text if this Document Book. The Document is
Norway No. 2. This is a report by a police official in Vedsos. Did you
ever gain knowledge of things mentioned in this document?
A.
No, I never gained knowledge of them. The action described here
seems to be identical with the shelling by the Naval units, which we
mentioned in the report "Hormann," but apart from that there is nothing I
can say about this whole document.
Q.
General, in this context there is one other question which has been
touched upon earlier. What became known to you at actions during
evacuation which might be objected to?
A.
Reports of the troops did not bring anything of this kind to my
knowledge, and practically that could not be expected of them
either. But the British Radio, the Russian radio, the Swedish radio, and
the Swedish press did bring certain incidents to my attentions. All
kinds of things were assorted in these reports, and I had every single
assertion followed up. I intended to take a large-scale countermeasure
against such excesses if the really had occurred, but all these
assertions turned out to be mere inventions, or else they were matters in
which neither the Army not the troops had been guilty. I would like to
give an example.
THE PRESIDENT:Just a minute.
time.
(A RECESS WAS TAKEN)

We'll take our morning recess at this
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THE MARSHAL:The Tribunal is again in session.
THE PRESIDENT:You may continue, Dr. Fritsch.
BY DR. FRITSCH:
Q.
General, first of all we have dealt with the military documents
concerning Norway and now we are dealing with some documents which I
would like to describe as civilian ones. Before the recess I asked you
what you have to say about objectionable occurrences in connection with
the carrying out of the evacuation and you stated that in particular you
received information about these things from the foreign press but that
these reports were either terribly exaggerated or else distorted. Now I
would like you to continue with describing these things. Please, would
you do so.
A.
I just wanted to quote and example of Russian propaganda.
The
Russian radio reported when the Russian troops came into the neighborhood
of Kirkones they found Norwegians living in cases, norwegians who ere
sick and had no medications, etc. and they added that in such a condition
the Germans left the Norwegians behind, but to this I could only say that
people concerned were people who had resisted being evacuated and they
had arrived in this condition through their own fault. Another report
was in the Swedish press. Some Norwegians were found frozen to death in
the Swedish-Norwegian frontier area.
They had insufficient clothing and
had marched through the mountains and so were frozen to death. These
were clearly people who did not want to be evacuated and had resolved by
themselves to find their way to Sweden and against this too the Army was
powerless; and then the Swedish press brought a reportabout the fact that
during the evacuation the Germans carried out such ruthless destruction
that they set a house on fire in which there was old men and the name of
locality was also given. In order to get this straight I ordered an
investigationunder military law. This was carried out by the XIX Corps
and in all details, it was shown clearly that no house had been set on
fire unless it have been previously searched in all corners, In this way
the
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propaganda accusations went on, but not in one single case did I find any
justified reason.
Q.
General, please turn to page 19 of the document book XXIII, English
page 17; this is document No. 516. Excuse me, Exhibit No. 516. This
contains a report of the City Engineer of Hammerfest which has been
accepted here for whatever probative value it may have. In this
connection I am only interested to know when Hammerfest was destroyed.
A.
From the report it can be seen that the destruction started at the
beginning of November, and that in January and February the destruction
continued.
Q.
Now with regard to the last document we are going to deal with here,
this is Exhibit No. 521, German page 68, and English page 71. It is
document No. 12. This document contains a calculation of the war damages
in Finmark. Can you please comment briefly to this question.
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A.
In order to comment on the war damages, of course, there is of
course, the masis missing the basic documents. From this report it can
be assumed however, that some items contain the total war damages and
then that the original damage figures were even increased in later
corrections. From these eports it can also be seen that in Norway until
the preparation for this trial tarted, [sic, ‘s' to faint to see on
image] nobody thought about these damages at all, and therefore these
calculations bear the characteristic of great speed and superfluity, and
from the date it can also be seen that these calculations were very
quickly made for the purpose of this trial, and I think that these facts
spear for themselves.
Q.
And now a few general questions; until when were you Commander in
Chief in Norway?
A.

Until January 13, 1945.

Q.

And then where did you go?

A.
Then I had the supreme command of Army Group North during the battle
in East PRussia.
Q.

And then later on you took over Army Group South, when was that?

A. Before that I had Army Group Kurland in the 6th Kurland battle, and
last of all I was in charge of Army Group South.
Q.

Army Group South was in operation against whom?

A.
Army Group South was in operation against the Russians in the areas
between Czechslovakia and Yugoslavia, and later on individual units
fought against the Americans, who came from the rear , from the West into
the back of the Army Group.
Q.

And when did you cease hostilities?

A. I stopped fighting on the 7th of May, 0900 hours, and this was against
the Americans, and then I gave the order to the four armies of the Army
Group that on the evening of the 7th they should withdraw from the
Russian front, and they should retreat towards the west.
Q.

And with which American General did you negotiate?

A.

I negotiated with General Walker, the Commanding General of the
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20th American Tank Corps, deputizing for General Patton, the Commander in
Chief of the 3rdAmerican Army.
Q. And then when were you made a prisoner of war?
A. On the 7th of May I gave myself up as a prisoner of war to the
Americans.
Q. What are you now?
A. I am convinced that I am still a prisoner of war.
Q.
And did you sign a statement to the effect that you were in
agreement with your release from being a prisoner of war?
A. No, it
beginning
signature
refuse to

wasn't like that. I signed the release certificate at the
of January together with 5 or 6 other officers. We gave the
only under the threat of disciplinary measures if we should
sign. The signatures were given under protest.

DR. FRITSCH:Your Honors, at the moment I have no further questions on
direct examination to the witness. I have had the intentionto submit at
this point the documents which I still have to submit, and these
documents were promised me by the Translating Division for this morning,
but I just heard that they won't be ready until this evening, and
therefore I would like to place the witness at the disposal of the
prosecution for cross-examination.
[....]

